The real exchange rate is very volatile relative to major macroeconomic aggregates and its correlation with the ratio of domestic over foreign consumption is negative (BackusSmith puzzle). These two observations constitute a puzzle to standard international macroeconomic theory. This paper develops a two country model with complete asset markets and limited enforcement for international financial contracts that provides a possible explanation of these two puzzles. The model performs better than a standard incomplete markets model with a single non-contingent bond unless very tight borrowing constraints are imposed in the latter. With limited enforcement for both domestic and international financial contracts, the model's asset pricing implications are brought into line with the empirical evidence, albeit at the expense of raising real exchange rate volatility.
Introduction
This paper analyses the interplay of three classic puzzles about the real exchange rate and asset prices:
1. the high volatility of the real exchange rate relative to the volatility of consumption (real exchange rate volatility puzzle), 2. the negative correlation of the real exchange rate with the ratio of domestic over foreign consumption (Backus-Smith puzzle), 3 . the low correlation of consumption across countries.
I develop a two country model with complete asset markets and limited enforcement of international financial contracts that provides a possible explanation of the these puzzles.
In their simplest form these three puzzles can be stated as follows.
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If preferences over consumption are given by the power utility function and all financial markets are complete, the real exchange rate between two countries is determined by the ratio of domestic and foreign consumption. This immediately implies that the correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption equals unity. Since there are no wealth effects under complete markets, consumption is highly correlated across countries. Therefore, the real exchange rate hardly fluctuates.
Given this apparent contradiction with the data, most international macroeconomists have concluded that international financial risk sharing is not complete. Lewis (1996) provides also direct empirical evidence that international risk sharing is incomplete. Although it is nowadays standard to assume that there are frictions in international financial markets, there has been little progress in explaining the first two puzzles. Two notable exceptions are Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2007) and Benigno and Thoenissen (2007) .
Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006) have recently challenged the view that international consumption risk sharing is very limited. Their analysis draws on the high volatility of asset prices and the implied high volatility of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Real exchange rates between industrialized economies fluctuate by as much as 10% per annum. However, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution estimated using asset returns varies by 40%. As the real exchange rate depreciates by the difference between the domestic and foreign intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, these estimated volatilities imply that the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are highly correlated between countries. Brandt et al interpret this finding as evidence, that international risk sharing is very good.
2
This paper attempts to clarify these contradictory conclusions about international risk sharing. I first follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) in assuming that international financial markets are complete but enforcement of international financial contracts is limited. Contracts are sustainable only to the extent that they can be enforced by the threat of permanent exclusion from trade in international financial markets if an agent reneges on her obligations. 4 The production/trade side of the economy is modelled as in Corsetti et al (2007) .
The distinguishing feature of their model is that the implied elasticity of substitution between traded goods is low since non-traded goods are used in the distribution of traded goods. This feature implies that absent international financial markets the real exchange rate is very volatile and the correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption is negative.
The key finding of my paper is that the model with complete asset markets and enforcement constraints can resolve the real exchange rate volatility puzzle and the Backus-Smith puzzle provided that agents are sufficiently impatient. If agents are impatient, only limited risk sharing can be sustained and the model behaves close to a model without international financial markets. If agents are very patient, contract enforcement works well and agents can share risk efficiently across countries. In this case consumption is highly correlated across countries, the real exchange rate is very smooth, and the correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption is close to unity. I also compare the model with limited contract enforcement to a model with a single non-contingent bond. The latter model fails to deliver substantial exchange rate volatility and a negative correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption unless tight constraints on international borrowing are imposed.
5
Because I follow the international finance literature in assuming complete and frictionless domestic asset markets and standard preferences, the model inherits all the puzzles of domestic asset pricing. In particular all asset prices are very smooth and the equity premium is too low.
6
One potential resolution of the equity premium puzzles in a closed economy is offered by Alvarez and Jermann (2001) . are several differences between their works and mine: I assume (i) an endowment economy in contrast to their production economies, (ii) a somewhat higher elasticity of substitution between traded goods and (iii) I solve the model using non-linear methods as opposed to a methond that is based log-linearization of the first order equations around the deterministic steady state. 6 See in particular Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) . 7 In line with the empirical findings presented in Heaton and Lucas (1996) , these authors assume that agents' idiosyncratic incomes are volatile relative to aggregate income. Also, asset markets are assumed to be complete 
The volatility of the real exchange rate
When embedding the assumption of complete markets and power utility into a general equilibrium model of the international business cycle, the predicted volatility of the real exchange rate σ q relative to consumption σ c 1 is too low for reasonable levels of risk aversion γ. In the data, the real exchange rate is roughly four times as volatile as consumption. However, models with complete international financial markets typically predict a very high correlation of consumption across countries
one can match a volatility ratio of 
, is a function of the consumption of the two tradables and the non-tradable good. A more explicit structure of the goods market is introduced in section 3.5. For now, all that is assumed, is that the endowment vector at time t can be mapped into an aggregate international resource constraint of the form (c 1 , c 2 ) |F (c 1 , c 2 , y) ≤ 0 . I assume that this set is non-empty, bounded, and strictly convex for each realization of the endowment vector. The latter is an immediate implication of the imperfect substitutability of the domestic and the foreign tradable good. The function F (·), defined as F (c 1 , c 2 , y) = 0, is differentiable with respect to its first two arguments. Since the real exchange rate is the price of the consumption basket in country 2 relative to country 1, the real exchange rate is Building on the seminal work of Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) international loans are assumed to be sustainable to the extent that they can be enforced by the threat of exclusion from future trade in asset markets.
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The enforcement constraint is therefore given by
where In Kehoe and Perri (2002) , the decision to default is made by the government. In this case the value of financial autarchy,
, is given by the discounted present value at the prices that actually occur in autarchy. If the default decision is made by the individual agent, however, each agent assumes that her decision to default will not affect prices in the goods market. The agent does not take into account that other agents might default, as well. In either case, the value of financial autarchy is determined from
s.t.
where the perceived prices
depend on who decides whether to default.
The maximization problem of each agent can now be stated as (2) and (3). 
the consumer allocations solve the consumers' problem in both countries, and in particular the enforcement constraints are satisfied; (2) the resource constraint holds 10 Jeske (2006) Since I consider a real economy, the nominal exchange rate is fixed at 1. Furthermore, the price of the final consumption good in each country is normalized to 1 and the real exchange rate is defined to be q (s
Solution
The approach follows Marcet and Marimon (1999) and Kehoe and Perri (2002) .
) denote the Lagrangian multipliers on the enforcement constraints in the optimization problem of the representative agent in country i. Using the "partial summation formula of Abel" this problem can be written as
and (3) is binding for country i and zero otherwise. Note that at each point in time, at most one country can be constrained.
The first order conditions of the representative agent in country i are summarized by
where
is the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint of an agent located in country i. Define the following variables
Equation (6) implies a law of motion for z (·)
Absent arbitrage opportunities,
, and I obtain an explicit expression for the real exchange rate
Iterating on this expression, delivers
where κ =
.
Interpretation
Computing equilibria in economies with limited enforcement involves finding the correct relative weights z. For a given sequence of Pareto weights {z (s
, the problem of the planner can be thought of as
For given z, the planner's problem at time t resembles the static optimal allocation problem.
Partial risk sharing
To understand the forces that operate in the economy with enforcement constraints, I compare the allocations under full risk sharing with the allocations in financial autarchy. Due to the concavity of u (·), consumption in country i varies less across states of the world under complete markets than in financial autarchy. Consequently, there is at least one realizations ∈ S, such that in this particular state the agent in country i receives higher consumption in financial autarchy than under full risk sharing. Obviously, full risk sharing (z (s t ) = 1 for all s t ) cannot be implemented if the discount factor β is close to zero. Ifs is realized, the utility loss from giving up the ability to share risk efficiently in the future is lower than the utility gain due to higher current consumption.
However, partial risk sharing might still be feasible. For simplicity, assume that at time t − 1 the realized relative weight is z (s t−1 ) = 1. Suppose that at s t country 1 receives a positive shock to its endowment. Rather than sharing the additional wealth with country 2, agents in country 1 prefer consuming this wealth by themselves, i.e., the enforcement constraint binds for country 1. To provide an incentive for country 1 to hand some of her wealth to country 2 in the current period t, the planner promises to raise her average consumption in the future. Under partial risk sharing, consumption in country 1 rises relative to consumption in country 2 both in period t and in future periods compared to the allocations under full risk sharing. From equations (9) and (12) this means that the weight on country 1 has to increase, i.e., z (s t ) < 1 which implies an appreciation of the real exchange rate in the decentralized economy.
Consumption-real exchange rate correlation
Equation (11) The correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption can be expressed as
In the standard complete market framework without enforcement constraint z is constant and σ (z) = 0. Hence, ρ q,
In the economy with enforcement constraints z is not constant and the correlation between z and relative consump-
is negative. If the enforcement constraint binds for country 1, the planner increases the weight on country 1 and increases current consumption in country 1 relative to country 2 as described previously. Equation (13) then implies that ρ q,
Goods markets
The aggregate resource constraint of the global economy,F (c 1 , c 2 , y (s t )) ≤ 0, is derived from the underlying endowments with traded and non-traded goods. One possible specification that allows me to address the real exchange rate volatility puzzle and the consumption real exchange rate puzzle has been proposed by Corsetti et al (2007) . There are four key features: imperfect substitutability between the domestic and the foreign tradable good, non-traded goods, distribution costs, and purchasing power parity for tradable goods at the producer level. 
Deriving the international resource constraint
The final consumption good c i is an aggregate of tradable and non-tradable goods:
where c T i is the consumption of an aggregate of the tradable goods and c N i is the consumption of the non-traded good in country i.
where c T ij denotes country i's consumption of the tradable good that originates in country j. For ρ < 1, the domestic and the foreign tradable goods are imperfect
, there is home-bias in consumption. 
Let P T ij denote the consumer price of the tradable good that originates in country j and is consumed in country i.P 
and c T i is defined by equation (15) . For the purpose of this paper it is convenient to summarize the allocations of the final good in terms of an international resource constraint (c 1 , c 2 ) |F (c 1 , c 2 , y) 
and equations (15) can be found from the first order conditions of (18).
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Furthermore, the real exchange rate is given by q =
. The curvature of the consumption set is key to understanding the volatility of the real exchange rate. Consider an increase in y T 1 . For reasonable parameterizations of the model and the shock, the international resource constraint hardly changes. In Figure 1 , the dotted line y
Discussion
is close to the solid line y c 2 ,y) . Due to the low curvature of the resource constraint in the economy with only traded goods, large swings in 
Calibration and results

Calibration
The values of the benchmark parameters and the endowment process are listed in Tables 1 and 2 . Preferences are represented by the power utility function, u (c) =
In the benchmark calibration the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ is set equal to 2. Two comments are in place to explain the choice of β. First, the model is calibrated to annual data due to data availability. Second and more important, partial risk sharing as an equilibrium phenomenon only arises if agents are sufficiently impatient. Otherwise, the equilibrium outcome is close to or identical to the full risk sharing scenario. In terms of the economics it is the value of the risk free rate that matters, which turns out to be around 1.5%. Table 2 ). The transition probabilities are then estimated from the artificial data using sample averages. Table 2 also shows properties of the actual data. The U.S. time series are more volatile than the series for the aggregate of the remaining G7 countries.
17
This is partly due to aggregation.
Also, manufacturing output is more volatile than service output and the volatility of total output lies in between the two.
Results and interpretation
Benchmark calibration
The economy is simulated 200 times over 500 periods.
18
Unless mentioned otherwise the artificial data is HP-filtered and the relevant statistics are computed for each simulation. The reported numbers are the averages over the 200 simulations. Table   3 reports data from the U.S. and the remaining G7 countries along with the results for the benchmark calibration for three different arrangements of the international financial markets: complete markets with enforcement constraints, complete markets without enforcement constraints and financial autarchy. In this section, it is 16 While the OECD STAN database provides quarterly data for manufacturing and services for some countries, it does not do so for all the G7 countries. assumed that the government is responsible for the default decision. As shown in section 5.2.2 the qualitative results do not depend on this choice.
19
The poor performance of the model with complete markets restates the exchange rate disconnect puzzle and the Backus-Smith puzzle: the real exchange rate is barely more volatile than consumption and its correlation with relative consumption equals 
20
The last column in table 3 shows the results for an incomplete markets economy with one non-contingent and borrowing limits that never bind in the simulation.
As is apparent form the table, the economy with one bond is much closer to the economy with complete markets than to the data: the real exchange rate is about as volatile as consumption and the correlation between the real exchange rate and 19 Changes in the default decision change the value of financial autarchy. By adjusting the discount factor β the behavior of the model can be brought in line with the data. 20 As shown in Bodenstein (2005) the differences between the model of financial autarchy and the model with enforcement constraints become more pronounced in a production economy with labor. 
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Under complete markets, however, there is no wealth effect. The extra endowment of meat is shared more equally between the two countries. Hence, the price of cooking services increases in both countries and the aforementioned second effect on the real exchange rate is weak. In contrast with the data, the real exchange rate now depreciates while U.S. consumption of meals increases relative to European consumption.
It is crucial to note, that the explanation of the Backus-Smith puzzle depends on the presence of shocks in the tradable goods sector. Shocks to the non-tradable goods sector induce a positive correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption irrespective of the financial market structure. 21 The simple endowment economy in this paper implies that the terms of trades and the real exchange rate move in opposite directions. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that these two variables move in the same direction over the business cycle. As shown in Bodenstein (2006) and Corsetti et al (2007) this problem is overcome in a production economy. Furthermore, shocks to non-traded goods and consumption taste shocks (not considered here) induce comovement of the terms of trade and the real exchange rate.
Sensitivity analysis
Since the ability to share risk depends on how patient agents are, changes in the time discount factor β have a strong impact on the results. Table 4 Table 5 offers sensitivity results for the value of risk aversion (first column), γ, the elasticity of substitution between traded goods (second and third column), Interpreting changes in the parameters ρ or φ is less straightforward than changes in β and γ. The time discount factor and the coefficient of risk aversion are the two parameters that directly control agents' willingness to share risk. Any changes in these parameters only affect the utility function of the agents but leave the set of feasible consumption allocations unchanged. However, the substitution elasticities between traded goods or traded and non-traded goods determine the set of feasible consumption allocations. Therefore, in response to changes of these parameters the business cycle moments change for any financial market arrangement. It remains to be mentioned, that a model without distribution costs delivers a negative correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption.
However, the volatility of the real exchange rate is much lower than in the data both in absolute value and relative to consumption. 22 5 A closer look at asset prices
The volatility of asset prices
The benchmark model with limited contract enforcement can account both for the volatility of the real exchange rate and the observed low or even negative correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption (Backus-Smith puzzle).
Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006) emphasize, that real exchange rate 22 The range of additional sensitivity analysis is huge. Reducing home bias in the economy, α 11 closer to 0.5, leads to a dcrease in the volatility of the real exchange rate, and to a higher correlation between the real exchange rates and relative consumption compared to the baseline calibration.
volatility is tightly linked to the volatility of asset prices. As shown in their work the growth rate of the real exchange rate equals the difference in the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IM RS) between the two countries when markets are complete. Brandt et al (2006) and Bodenstein (2005) show how the IM RS is estimated using only data on asset returns. The annualized standard deviation of the IM RS is about 40% to 50% depending on the data used for the estimation and therefore much higher than the roughly 6% of the real exchange rate.
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This implies that the IM RS for the U.S. and the aggregate of the remaining G7 countries must be highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of more than 0.98 to be consistent with a real exchange rate volatility of 6%. are smooth and the equity premium is too low. The volatility of the IM RS in the model is exceeded by a factor of 5 in the data. Under the benchmark calibration, the real exchange rate is also more volatile than the IM RS. This finding is hardly surprising as I have merely extended the equity premium puzzle to its international dimension. As shown by Mehra and Prescott (1985) for a closed economy, standard preferences and complete frictionless domestic financial markets imply little volatility of the IM RS since aggregate endowment shocks are small. In the benchmark model domestic financial markets are complete and frictionless and the calibrated 23 The general consensus is that the IM RS varies by at least 50% for US stock market data. In Bodenstein (2005) the standard deviations are lower since I use a more volatile proxy for the risk free rate to calculate excess returns for equity for the reason of data availability. endowment shocks -which can even be smoothed to some extent in international financial markets -are relatively small.
One potential resolution to the equity premium puzzle in a closed economy is offered by Alvarez and Jermann (2001) . In line with empirical findings, these authors assume that agents' idiosyncratic incomes are volatile relative to aggregate income. In addition, they assume that asset markets are complete, but enforcement of financial contracts is limited.
In this section, I extend the simple two country model along the lines of Alvarez and Jermann in order to simultaneously address the three puzzles mentioned in the introduction: the volatility of the real exchange rate, the consumption real exchange rate puzzle and the volatility of (other) asset prices. From now on I assume that both domestic and international financial contracts can only be enforced by the threat of permanent exclusion from all financial markets.
The extended model
There are two groups of agents in country 1 which are denoted by 1 and 2. The agents in country 2 are labeled agents 3 and 4. Each agent i in country j faces a maximization problem similar to the one of the representative agents in section 3.1: In this version of the model, I assume that the default decision is made by each agent individually. Therefore she ignores the effect of her behavior on goods market
prices. An agent who defaults on any contract is banned from all financial markets, but she can still trade in the spot markets for goods.
The solution of the model is fully characterized by the first order conditions
,
and the national and international resource constraints, the real exchange rate
, and the enforcement constraints. C j denotes aggregate consumption in country j. The solution of this model is found by following the same steps as in the benchmark model with the additional complication that the system now contains three endogenous state variables (η 1 , η 2 and z). The relevant asset pricing kernels are given by
. The price of a contingent claim is given by the IM RS of the unconstrained agents. Within a country the pricing kernels satisfy m 1 (s
) and similarly for agents 3 and 4. The IM RS across countries are related
whereM i is the marginal rate of substitution for country i.
A numerical example 5.3.1 Calibration
As in the benchmark model, the endowment with traded goods can be either high or low in each country. However, the endowment with non-traded goods is assumed to be constant in this part of the analysis in order to keep the state space manageable. is the share of agent i in the aggregate income of her home country.
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The transition matrix for the income distribution in country 1 is given by
0.2577 0.7423 and similarly for country 2. These income processes for the agents are assumed to be independent across countries. The remaining parameters are taken from Table 2 unless explicitly noted otherwise in Table 6 . 24 The 4 state endowment process is calibrated to match the business cycle statistics of the manufacturing sectors in the U.S. and the remaining G7 countries reported in table 3 . 25 Based on a large sample from the PSID, Heaton and Lucas (1996) 
Results and interpretation
The model is simulated 200 times over 500 periods. The artificial data is HPfiltered and the relevant business cycle statistics are computed. The moments for the IM RS are calculated from non-filtered data. Table 2 For γ = 2, the model predicts that the IM RS in the two countriesM i are volatile and reasonably close to the data (40% in the model compared to my estimates of 45%) in the low risk sharing scenario. In addition, the implied risk-free rate is 2%. Also, the model predicts a negative correlation between the relative consumption and the real exchange rate. However, the real exchange rate moves too much now:
its volatility is about 53 times the volatility of consumption for the HP-filtered time series, whereas this ratio is less than 4 in the data. Similarly, the growth rate of q fluctuates too much.
In the high risk sharing scenario, income heterogeneity within a country does not matter. Agents make efficient use of the domestic financial markets and individual consumption behaves similar to aggregate consumption. While the model correctly predicts the real exchange volatility and the negative correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption, it fails to generate volatile asset prices. The
IM RS varies about only 7%.Remember that the real exchange rate depreciates by the difference between the log of the foreign and the domestic IM RS:
For β = 0.70, risk sharing between agents within each country and across countries is severely limited and the correlation between the stochastic discount factors for the two countries is low (0.1673). Given the volatility of the stochastic discount factors, the real exchange rate fluctuates too much.
By 
Conclusions
Most international macroeconomists believe that international risk sharing is limited by financial market frictions and that these frictions are key to understanding the international business cycle. This paper examines the extent to which models with endogenous incomplete markets can resolve the exchange rate volatility puzzle and the Backus-Smith puzzle. A model with complete markets and enforcement constraints for international financial contracts but frictionless domestic asset markets provides a candidate explanation of these two puzzles if agents are not too patient.
For sufficiently impatient agents, international risk sharing is very limited. As a result cross country consumption levels are lowly correlated and real exchange rates are volatile and negatively correlated with relative consumption across countries.
However, since asset markets are complete within each country and aggregate income fluctuations are low, the model inherits all the standard asset pricing puzzles.
In particular, it implies stochastic discount factors that are too smooth vis-à-vis the data. Once I extend the benchmark model by introducing enforcement constraints also into each country's local financial markets, the model delivers more volatile asset prices. However, it now fails to deliver the right amount of real exchange rate volatility. As risk sharing is low both within and across countries, the marginal rates of substitution in the two countries are not very correlated and the real exchange rate is too volatile in comparison to the data. It seems that models that severely restrict the amount of international risk sharing for all agents will be subject to this failure, once it has been enriched to deliver realistic asset pricing behavior. Table 3 Sensitivity analysis economy with enforcement constraints Table 4 Sensitivity analysis economy with enforcement constraints wrt other parameters higher risk higher trade lower trade higher elast. lower elast no distrib. 
